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For a given ensemble of N independent and identically prepared particles,
we calculate the binary decision costs of different strategies for measurement
of polarised spin 1/2 particles. The result proves that, for any given values of
the prior probabilities and any number of constituent particles, the cost for a
combined measurement is always less than or equal to that for any combina-
tion of separate measurements upon sub-ensembles. The Bayes cost, which is
that associated with the optimal strategy (i.e., a combined measurement) is
obtained in a simple closed form.
PACS Numbers : 02.50.-r, 02.50.Le, 03.65.Bz
In a problem of experimental design, the task of the experimentalist is to find an optimal
observational strategy. Ordinarily, one must choose among different strategies before the
data can be obtained, and hence one must perform a preposterior analysis. When the
experiment involves a decision among different quantum mechanical states, such an analysis
is indeed important, since, unlike the classical case, virtual sampling, i.e., repeated samplings
of the same system, are not generally permitted.
There are a number of different approaches for finding an optimal strategy. In the
information-theoretic approach, one typically determines the strategy that maximises the
mutual information (see, e.g., [1]), but this is generally difficult, owing to the nonlinear
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nature of the Shannon information. In the minimax approach [2], one finds the strategy that
minimises the maximum cost (or loss) incurred by the decision among different strategies.
When certain a priori knowledge concerning the nature of the state is available, then one
may seek a strategy that minimises the expected cost, using a Bayes procedure [2], [3].
In the present Letter, we study the Bayesian approach to a binary decision problem for an
ensemble of polarised spin 1/2 particles. First, we briefly introduce the Bayesian approach
to quantum hypothesis testing. These notions, developed by Helstrom and others ( [4],
[5], and [6]), are then applied to obtain the optimal strategy for a Bayes decision between
two quantum mechanical pure states, for an ensemble of polarised spin 1/2 particles. In this
example, we first study the application of quantum Bayes sequential analysis to the ensemble.
The result is then compared with a combined measurement of the entire ensemble, treated
as a single composite system. Other strategies consisting of combined measurements of
sub-ensembles are also considered. The Bayes solution to the problem demonstrates that
the Bayes cost for separate sequential measurements of the individual particles is the same
as that of a combined measurement. This result differs from that predicted by Peres and
Wootters [7]. Any other strategy turns out to entail a higher expected cost. Nevertheless, we
conclude, for the reasons given below, that a combined measurement of the entire ensemble
is, in general, an optimal one.
First, consider a decision problem requiring a choice among M hypotheses H1, · · · , HM
concerning a quantum system. Hypothesis Hk asserts that the density operator of the system
is ρˆk, (k = 1, · · · ,M), and the prior probability of the j-th state is ξj, with
M∑
k=1
ξk = 1 . (1)
From past experience, one knows that the system is in the j-th state with a relative frequency
ξj. The self-adjoint operators ρˆk act on the vectors of a Hilbert space H, are non-negative
definite, and have unit trace.
A quantum decision strategy is characterised by a probability operator measure (pom) on
H, i.e., a set of M non-negative definite self-adjoint operators Πj satisfying
2
M∑
j=1
Πj = 1 . (2)
If this pom is applied to the system when hypothesis Hk is true, then the conditional
probability of choosing hypothesis Hj is given by
Pr(X = j|W = k) = Tr(ρkΠj) . (3)
Here, X denotes the random variable that is to be observed, and W , typically being the
parameter, is the unknown state of nature.
Now, let Cij be the cost of choosing hypothesis Hi when Hj is true. Then the expected
cost of the observational strategy specified by the pom {Πj} is [4]
C¯ =
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
ξjCijTr(ρˆjΠi) ≡ Tr
M∑
i
RiΠi , (4)
where the Hermitian risk operators Ri are defined by
Ri =
M∑
j=1
ξjCij ρˆj . (5)
A set {Πj} of pom that minimises the cost (4), under the constraints (2), is defined as
optimal and the cost is Bayes, i.e., C¯ = C¯∗ (the suprescript * here corresponds to the optimal
strategy). Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of a pom are known to be
[5], [6] the self-adjointness of the operator
Υ =
M∑
j=1
RjΠj =
M∑
j=1
ΠjRj (6)
and the non-negative definiteness of the operator Rj−Υ for all j = 1, · · · ,M . The minimum
expected Bayes cost is thus
C¯∗(ξ, {Π∗j}) = Tr Υ . (7)
In a simple case where M = 2, i.e., for binary decisions, one can easily verify [4] that the
optimal pom is projection valued, and the Bayes cost becomes
C¯∗(ξ, {Π∗j}) = ξ1C11 + ξ2C12
−ξ2(C12 − C22)
∑
ηi>0
ηi , (8)
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where ηi are the eigenvalues of the operator ρˆ2 − γρˆ1, with
γ =
ξ1(C21 − C11)
ξ2(C12 − C22)
=
ξ
1− ξ
. (9)
Here and in the sequel, we choose a 0-1 cost structure; Cij = 1− δij, i.e., assign cost 1 to an
incorrect decision and 0 to a correct decision. Also, the prior probability for state 1 is given
by ξ1 = ξ, and hence ξ2 = 1− ξ.
Now, we consider an experiment where a physicist must estimate (decide) the direction
of polarisation of a given ensemble of N spin 1/2 particles, using a Stern-Gerlach (s-g)
device. The physicist knows that the particles have been filtered through another s-g device
with a magnetic field in the x − y plane at a constant angle θ1 or θ2 from the x-axis, and
in either case the spin up state has been selected. The physicist can select the orientation
angle φ of the detector relative to the x-axis. When the particle passes through the field
of the detector magnet, the physicist observes either the spin up (head) or spin down (tail)
state, whereupon he must decide between the alternatives θ1 (i.e., the polarisation direction
θ = θ1) and θ2. We do not specify the values of the angles {θk}, but the difference between
the two angles is given by |θ2 − θ1| = 2δ.
First, consider the case where the physicist performs sequential observations of each
individual spin 1/2 particle. Suppose, for simplicity, that N = 1. The physicist has to
decide, either before or after the observation, whether the particle is polarised in the θ1 or
θ2 direction. If a decision were to be chosen without any observation, then a Bayes decision
against the prior distribution ξ(W ) of W (in this case, W = 1 or 2) would be optimal.
Suppose that X (spin ‘up’ or ‘down’) is observed before a decision is chosen. Then, the
decision process for the physicist follows the same procedure as the previous case. However,
the difference here is that the distribution of W has changed from the prior to the posterior
distribution. Hence, a Bayes decision against the posterior distribution ofW is now optimal.
The conditional probability for observing the spin up (+1) state, when the state of the
system is ρˆk, is given by
bk(φ) ≡ Pr(X = +1|W = θk) = cos
2(
θk − φ
2
) . (10)
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If one fixes the angle φ, then the experiment is entirely analogous to a classical coin tossing
problem [8], with coins whose bias is given by the above bk. However, having the freedom
to choose the angle φ for each value of the prior ξ, the physicist must choose an optimal
direction given by [9]
φopt(ξ) = tan
−1
(
ξ sin θ1 − (1− ξ) sin θ2
ξ cos θ1 − (1− ξ) cos θ2
)
. (11)
Hence, we have a problem of tossing quantum coins whose bias is a function of the prior
probability ξ.
Having chosen the optimal angle φopt, the Bayes decision rule specifies that θ1 is to be
chosen if the spin up state is observed, and θ2 otherwise. The Bayes cost against the prior
ξ, when N = 1, can easily be obtained by calculating the eigenvalues of ρˆ2 − γρˆ1, with the
result [9]
C¯∗(ξ, 1) =
1
2
(
1−
√
2ξ2 − (2 + cos 2δ)ξ + 1
)
. (12)
Now, suppose that N = 2, and the result of measurement of the first particle has been
obtained. As mentioned above, the physicist must follow the same procedures as in the case
N = 1, with the posterior distribution ξ(±) instead of the prior ξ. From Bayes’ theorem,
the posterior probability that θ = θ1 is given by
ξ(+) =
b1(φ) · ξ
b1(φ) · ξ + b2(φ) · (1− ξ)
(13)
or
ξ(−) =
(1− b1(φ)) · ξ
(1− b1(φ)) · ξ + (1− b2(φ)) · (1− ξ)
, (14)
according to the outcome (+ or −) of the first measurement. The optimal orientation
angle, before performing the second measurement, is now given by φopt(ξ(+)) or φopt(ξ(−)),
accordingly. The Bayes cost for this case (N = 2) is given by the weighted average, i.e.,
C¯∗ = b1ξC¯
∗(ξ(+), 1) + b2(1 − ξ)C¯
∗(ξ(−), 1) .
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Next, we consider an arbitrary number N of particles. Again, the procedures are the same
as above, except that the prior is now replaced by one of the 2N−1 posteriors [ξ(+ + · · ·+),
· · ·], after observations of N−1 particles. In a classical Bayes decision procedure [2], [3], it is
difficult (or impossible) to obtain the Bayes cost as a closed function ofN . The reason is that,
first, one must study the tree [10] of the posterior distributions, with branches proliferating
as ∼ 2N . To each branch (i.e., posterior) of the tree, one associates the cost C¯∗(·, 1), and
then calculates the weight (probability) for the sequence of outcomes associated with that
branch. After these considerations, one can, in principle, obtain the weighted average of
the cost, which involves 2N−1 terms. (Note that, for classical coins, the branches of the
posterior tree do recombine and hence proliferate as ∼ N . However, the weights associated
with the branches do not recombine, and therefore one cannot avoid the consideration of
2N−1 terms.)
In the case of our “quantum coins”, the situation appears even worse, since, after each
observation, the physicist must turn the device in accordance with formula (11). This results
in changing the bias bk(φ) of the “coins” at each stage, and hence one must also incorporate
the bias tree (which proliferates ∼ 2N). However, it turns out that this optimal orientation
forces the posterior tree to recombine into two branches, i.e.,
ξ(n,±) =
1
2
(
1±
√
1− 4ξ(1− ξ) cos2(n−1) δ
)
, (15)
where ± corresponds to the outcome of the last (n− 1-th) trial being spin up (+) or down
(−). This result can be proven by induction as follows. First, for n = 1, it is easily verified
that ξ(1,±) = ξ(±) as given in (13) and (14). Next, assume that the last (n−1-th) outcome
of the trial is (−), and that the posterior is given by the above ξ(n,−). Then, if the next
trial outcome is (+), follows from Bayes’ theorem, that the posterior distribution, after n+1
observations, is given by
ξ(· · · − +) =
b1(φ) · ξ(n,−)
b1(φ) · ξ(n,−) + b2(φ) · (1− ξ(n,−))
,
with φ = φopt(ξ(n,−)). After some algebra, one can show that the above ξ(· · · − +) =
ξ(n+1,+). The other three cases [ξ(· · ·−−), etc.] can also be treated in the same manner.
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Although the weights for different branches neither recombine in the quantum case, since
C¯∗(ξ(n,+), 1) = C¯∗(ξ(n,−), 1), the final average cost is just C¯∗(ξ(n,±), 1) times the sum of
all the different weights (which is just 1), and hence we finally deduce that the Bayes cost
for sequential observations is
C¯∗(ξ, N) = C¯∗(ξ(N − 1,±), 1)
=
1
2
(
1−
√
1− 4ξ(1− ξ) cos2N δ
)
, (16)
for either value of the N − 1-th outcome (+ or −).
Next, consider the case where the physicist treats the entire ensemble as a single com-
posite system. The total spin of a system with N particles is just N/2, and the density
operator for a spin N/2 particle polarised in the direction n = (cos θ, sin θ, 0) is given by
(ρˆ(θ))mn = 2
−N
√
NCm NCne
−i(m−n)θ , (17)
where (n,m) = 0, · · · , N . According to the result in (8), one must find the eigenvalues of the
matrix ρˆ2− γρˆ1 in order to obtain the Bayes cost. We first show that the matrix ρˆ2− γρˆ1 is
of rank two, and thus has only two non-zero eigenvalues. Define two vectors u = {un} and
v = {vn} by
un ≡ 2
−N/2
√
NCne
inθ1 , (18)
and
vn ≡ 2
−N/2
√
NCne
inθ2 . (19)
Then, (ρˆ1)mn = u
∗
mun and (ρˆ2)mn = v
∗
mvn. Since the inner product u · u
∗ = v · v∗ = 1, one
obtains
ρˆ1u
∗ =
∑
n
(ρˆ1)mnu
∗
n = u
∗
and similarly, ρˆ2v
∗ = v∗. Now, let w and λ be an eigenvector and the corresponding
eigenvalue of the matrix ρˆ2 − γρˆ1, i.e.,
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(ρˆ1 − γρˆ2)w = λw . (20)
We may expand the eigenvector w in terms of a basis that contains either u∗ or v∗, i.e.,
w = c1u
∗ + u∗⊥ or w = c2v
∗ + v∗⊥. Here, u
∗
⊥ denotes some vector orthogonal to u
∗, and
similarly for v∗⊥. However, since ρˆ1u
∗
⊥ = ρˆ2v
∗
⊥ = 0, we have
λw = c1u
∗ − γc2v
∗ . (21)
Therefore, the matrix ρˆ2 − γρˆ1 is of rank two, as claimed. On the other hand, if we form
the inner product of the two vectors w = c1u
∗ + u∗⊥ and u, we obtain
w · u = c1 =
c1
λ
−
γ
λ
c2(v
∗ · u) , (22)
and similarly,
w · v = c2 =
c1
λ
(u∗ · v)−
γ
λ
c2 . (23)
Without any loss of generality, we may now set c1 = 1, and then by eliminating c2 from the
above equations, we obtain the eigenvalues of the matrix ρˆ2 − γρˆ1, i. e.,
λ± =
1
2
{
(1− γ)±
√
(1− γ)2 − 4γ(∆2 − 1)
}
, (24)
where
∆2 = (v∗ · u)(u∗ · v)
=
∣∣∣∣∣2−N
N∑
m=0
NCme
2imδ
∣∣∣∣∣
2
= cos2N(δ) . (25)
Therefore, the binary Bayes decision cost for a spin N/2 particle is
C¯∗(ξ, N) =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− 4ξ(1− ξ) cos2N δ
)
. (26)
One immediately observes that the above cost (26) is the same as that obtained from sequen-
tial analysis, given by (16). Hence, the Bayes solution to our optimisation problem states
that a combined measurement is as advantageous as sequential measurements. These two
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strategies, however, are not the only ones, and many other partially combined measurement
procedures are possible. However, in the present formalism of sequential analysis, the only
effect of any intermediate measurements, either partially combined or not, consists in updat-
ing the posterior distributions. Since the Bayes cost is a monotonically decreasing function
of the number of updating steps, this implies that any partially combined measurements will
increase the cost. Therefore, we may now conclude that the optimal measurement strategy
consists in either performing a combined measurement of the entire ensemble or perform-
ing sequential measurements of the individual particles. Any other strategies will result in
higher costs.
This result is quite different from that expected by Peres and Wootters, who conjectured
that sequential measurements can never be as efficient as a combined measurement [7].
However, it is important to note that their conjecture is based upon an information-theoretic
approach, and the solution of an optimisation problem using a Bayesian approach can yield
a different result. Massar and Popescu [11], on the other hand, have proved the above
mentioned conjecture explicitly for the case N = 2. The method used therein is effectively
similar to a Bayesian approach, without the use of the prior distributions. However, when
a prior distribution is available, the Bayes solution is known to be optimal in general [2].
If prior knowledge is not available, one can still apply the Bayesian approach, using a non-
informative prior. The analysis of such cases is, however, beyond the scope of the present
Letter.
Throughout the present Letter, we have only considered the cost associated with making
decisions. In any practical situation, on the other hand, one must take into consideration
other costs (e.g., the observational cost, the cost of analysing the results, etc.). In our exam-
ple of sequential analysis, for example, at each stage before performing an observation, the
physicist must analyse the previous results in order to determine the optimal turning angle.
One might argue that [2] the analysing cost can be ignored, since, after all, scientists are so
underpaid that the cost of their labors is usually negligible! Nonetheless, the observational
costs cannot be ignored in general. Assuming the linearity of the utility function (e.g., that
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the total cost is just the sum of the decision cost and the observational costs), it is clear
that any separate measurements will result in a higher total cost, since the decision cost for
optimal sequential measurements (i.e., sequential measurements with optimal angular orien-
tations) can never be lower than that for a combined measurement. Therefore, we conclude,
after these considerations, that a combined measurement is optimal in general.
In connection with the decision problem for classical coins which was briefly mentioned
above, it is interesting to note that all the quantum results obtained by calculating the
eigenvalues of the density operators can, in principle, be recovered from purely classical
calculations, even for sequential measurements, if and only if the spins of the particles
concerned are 1/2. That is, provided one does not perform any combined measurements,
the results can be obtained from classical calculations. More details of this, as well as
a treatment including the observational costs, may be found in [8]. (See, also [9] for a
comparison between classical and quantum coin tossings.)
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